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I. Introduction 
There is a misdemeanor crisis in the United States. The 
recent exponential growth in lower court prosecutions for “minor” 
charges has drawn increasing numbers of individuals into contact 
with the criminal justice system.1 Those individuals exit with a 
permanent, easily accessible electronic record of that contact that 
can affect future employment, housing, and many other basic 
facets of daily life.2 After two decades of declining crime,3 police, 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges have stayed busy by 
shifting their focus from serious crimes to petty misdemeanors. A 
2010 analysis of seventeen state courts revealed that 
misdemeanors comprised 77.5% of the total criminal caseload in 
                                                                                                     
 1. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, 
NAT’L ASS’N CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009) 
[hereinafter MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE] (estimating that the volume of 
misdemeanor cases rose from 5 million in 1972 to 10.5 million in 2006, and that 
in 2006 there was a “median misdemeanor rate of 3,544 per 100,000” people). 
 2. See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, National Inventory of the Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/Collater 
alConsequences/QueryConsequences (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (search of 
“misdemeanor” in Texas reveals 450 entries relating to collateral consequences 
of “any misdemeanor” or particular misdemeanor convictions) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also James B. Jacobs, The Expanding 
Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 177, 178 (2008) (“This Article documents how criminal history records are 
expanding in scope and how their dissemination is proliferating.”). 
 3. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1990-2010, at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4515 (“The number of murder arrests in the U.S. fell 
by half between 1990 and 2010. The adult and juvenile arrest rates dropped 
substantially in the 1990s, while both continued to fall about 20% between 2000 
and 2010, reaching their lowest levels since at least 1990.”); Richard A. Oppel 
Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at 
A17 (citing the steady decline in major crime after a peak in the early 1990s). 
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those courts.4 Although mass incarceration continues to plague 
states around the nation,5 the current criminal justice crisis is 
more aptly characterized as one of mass misdemeanor 
processing. 
Legislators have added misdemeanor after misdemeanor 
(and many local ordinances) to the criminal law books.6 Law 
enforcement, applying “zero-tolerance” or “order-maintenance” 
policing policies, has aggressively enforced those statutes.7 
These mass misdemeanor arrests happen even though the 
theory upon which zero-tolerance policing is based, namely 
broken windows theory, did not envision moving so much petty 
crime through the criminal judicial system.8 In the 1982 
                                                                                                     
 4. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING 
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 
(2012), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/CSP2010.aspx.  
 5. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011) (“California’s prisons 
are designed to house a population just under 80,000, but at the time of the 
decision under review the population was almost double that.”); see generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (highlighting disproportionate mass incarceration of 
persons of color through the War on Drugs); MARC MAUER & MEDIA CHESNEY-
LIND, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (2002) (exploring mass incarceration in the United States as a 
result of “tough on crime” political attitudes that prevailed in the 1980s–1990s 
and the wide-ranging effects on families and communities).  
 6. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 523−79 (2001) (describing the legislative process of 
criminalization); see also THE SMART ON CRIME COALITION, RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS (2011), http://www.colorado.gov/ccjjdir/ 
Resources/Resources/Ref/SmartOnCrimeCoalition.pdf (“Unfortunately, since the 
initial publication of Smart on Crime in 2009 . . . [w]e continue to see our 
criminal codes and sentences—and, therefore, the demand on law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and prisons—expand.”). 
 7. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF 
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001) (describing order-maintenance policing as 
“proactive enforcement of misdemeanor laws and zero tolerance for minor 
offenses”). 
 8. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (linking visible public disorder, like broken windows, 
to the neighborhood residents’ perception of safety and, more tenuously, to 
violent crime in the neighborhood); see also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from 
Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 279 (2009) (“Order-maintenance policing 
as described in Broken Windows neither demands nor suggests that zero 
tolerance arrest policies are efficient, desirable, or effective methods to achieve 
order and reduce fear.”); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 7, at 6–7 (scrutinizing 
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article, Broken Windows, authors Kelling and Wilson described 
the order-maintenance function of the police officers that they 
had observed on foot patrol in a Newark neighborhood:  
If a stranger loitered, [Officer] Kelly would ask him if he 
had any means of support and what his business was; if he 
gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. 
Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who 
bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for 
vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.9  
In this description, only one of the three scenarios ended in 
an arrest. And it is not clear that the one arrest would end up 
in a court. Indeed, Kelling and Wilson noted that “[o]rdinarily, 
no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute 
over the appropriate level of neighborhood order” and that “a 
judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police 
officer.”10  
Prosecutors have largely failed to exercise discretion and 
seek justice in sorting through the huge number of 
misdemeanor cases that the police send them, instead churning 
high volumes through the overburdened lower courts.11 
Indigent defense attorneys have in many instances abdicated 
their professional, constitutional, and ethical duties to provide 
effective, zealous representation to their misdemeanor 
clients.12 Judges have been complicit, failing to dismiss weak 
                                                                                                     
evidence and policy behind “broken windows” theory). 
 9. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 8, at 29. 
 10. HARCOURT, supra note 7, at 6. 
 11. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 24 (2007) (discussing the process in which prosecutors file charges 
for misdemeanors); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the 
Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1716 (2010) 
(citing data showing low levels of prosecutorial declination of charges in petty 
offense cases and noting that “[t]he fact that prosecutors so rarely declined petty 
and public order cases reflects prosecutors’ well-substantiated expectation that 
these cases are likely to be disposed of summarily and successfully”).  
 12. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 19 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE], available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_ 
indigent_defendants/initiatives/indigent_defense_systems_improvement/gideons
_broken_promise.html (discussing the lack of investigation, research, and 
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cases based on questionable police testimony or to intervene 
when underresourced indigent defenders fail to provide 
effective representation to their many clients.13 In short, there 
is little reason to have confidence in the outcome of convictions 
secured in our lower criminal courts,14 and much support for a 
“crisis” characterization.15 
The adaptions that allow institutional actors to process 
high numbers of misdemeanor cases in overburdened lower 
courts are a formidable force working against solutions to the 
crisis. A major driver of the mass misdemeanor system is that 
there is relatively little immediate and obvious cost, 
particularly at a time when felony crime is relatively low.16 
Almost no one spends enough time screening, defending, and 
adjudicating misdemeanors to feel the full cost; in New York 
City, for example, 2011 statistics show that fewer than 1 in 500 
individuals charged with a misdemeanor go to trial.17 As the 
Supreme Court recently noted, “plea bargaining is . . . not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”18 In misdemeanor cases, those pleas happen quickly 
                                                                                                     
zealous advocacy of indigent defense attorneys); MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, 
supra note 1, at 38−40 (discussing barriers to zealous representation in 
misdemeanor courts).  
 13. See generally Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the 
Court: Trial Court Responsibility for Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 425 (2004). 
 14. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316 
(2012) (discussing the high tolerance for wrongful petty convictions). 
 15. See generally John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving 
Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing deprivations of 
right to counsel in lower courts); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: 
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
277, 279−82 (2011) (describing the misdemeanor crisis); see also Cara H. Drinan, 
The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s 
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 488 (2010) (noting the 
persistence of the indigent defense crisis, despite substantial research and 
evidence on the matter). 
 16. See SNYDER, supra note 3, at 1 (providing statistics showing a decline in 
felony arrest rates in the United States). 
 17. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 16 
(2011) [hereinafter NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT], 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf.  
 18. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott 
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 
(1992)). 
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and are thus relatively cheap for the system; in some 
jurisdictions, for example, almost 70% of lower criminal court 
cases are resolved at arraignment.19  
What if the criminal justice system did feel the immediate 
cost of mass misdemeanor processing? Michelle Alexander’s 
provocative New York Times Op-Ed, Go to Trial: Crash the 
Justice System, explored the idea and potential effects of a 
“large scale . . . refus[al] to plea-bargain when charged with a 
crime.”20 There were understandably strong responses to the 
Op-Ed, many of them focused on the impracticality of the 
proposal, but some on the ethical problems with such an 
approach.21 What these critiques often missed was Alexander’s 
                                                                                                     
 19. See ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS 14–15 (2011), available at www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset. 
aspx?id=20794 (discussing observation of 1,649 misdemeanor adjudications in 
twenty-one Florida counties, where “[a]lmost 70% of defendants observed 
entered a guilty or no contest plea at arraignment”); SPANGENBERG GRP., STATUS 
OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 142 (2006), 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGrou 
pReport.pdf (documenting how in 2000 in New York City, private attorneys 
representing indigent defendants through an assigned counsel plan “were 
disposing of 69 percent of all misdemeanor cases at arraignment”). While these 
quick misdemeanor pleas allow mass volume in the lower courts at relatively 
low cost, this cost calculation fails to account for long-term harms to society 
flowing from the misdemeanor crisis. There is an enormous societal cost in the 
form of a permanent and large group of individuals exiting the system with 
misdemeanor convictions and thus serious obstacles to finding work and 
housing. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L 
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION NEED NOT APPLY: THE CASE FOR REFORMING 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN EMPLOYMENT 25 (2011), http://www. 
nelp.org/page/-/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf?nocdn=1 (recognizing that 
despite regulations meant to protect those with criminal records, people are still 
being categorically banned from employment); LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER 
PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING 
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 16 (2004), http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-
reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf (discussing how public housing 
authorities consider a person’s criminal record). 
 20. Michelle Alexander, Op-ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at SR 5. 
 21. See, e.g., Norm Pattis, Michelle Alexander’s Dangerous Pipe Dream, 
NORMAN PATTIS BLOG (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.pattisblog.com/index.php? 
article=Michelle_Alexanders_Dangerous_Pipe_Dream_5309 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2013) (“The suggestion that individual clients commit what will amount to 
individual and collective suicide to crash the system is a dangerous pipe dream. 
No decent criminal defense lawyer will entertain the thought.”) (on file with the 
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larger point: “The system of mass incarceration depends almost 
entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to control,” and 
having a critical mass of defendants refuse to play along would 
lead to “chaos [that] would force mass incarceration to the top 
of the agenda for politicians and policy makers, leaving them 
only two viable options: sharply scale back the number of 
criminal cases filed . . . or amend the Constitution (or 
eviscerate it by judicial ‘emergency’ fiat).”22 
One might apply Alexander’s mass incarceration critique 
to the mass arrest and prosecution crisis happening in the 
lower criminal courts. There are many potential responses to 
the misdemeanor crisis, including more rigorous prosecutorial 
screening and exercise of discretion in charging 
decisions,23 better funding for defender offices,24 statewide 
oversight of public defender systems,25 caseload 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). Many of these responses unfairly ignored 
that Alexander herself raised many of these issues within the Op-Ed. For 
example, she described being “stunned” when someone first raised the idea of 
organized plea refusals with her, noting that this person “knows the risks 
involved in forcing prosecutors to make cases against people who have been 
charged with crimes. Could she be serious about organizing people, on a large 
scale, to refuse to plea-bargain when charged with a crime?” Alexander, supra 
note 20, at SR 5.  
 22. Alexander, supra note 20, at SR 5. 
 23. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 19−41 (discussing importance and power of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, 
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31–33 (2002) (pointing 
to structured prosecutorial screening as an alternative to plea bargaining). 
 24. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 7–11, 13–14, 29–37, 
41 (discussing various problems in indigent defense). 
 25. See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO 
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006), http://www.courts. 
state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report 
06.pdf (outlining a proposal for a fully state-funded statewide defender system 
to ensure the constitutional right to quality representation for indigent 
defendants in New York State); GA CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. 3 
(2001), available at www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idc 
report.doc (“The state of Georgia lacks a statewide system of accountability and 
oversight to provide constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel for indigent 
defendants.”); NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE 
CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE, 196–228 (2011) 
[hereinafter REASONABLE CASELOADS], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads.authcheckd
am.pdf (analyzing state oversight of public defender programs in 
Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and California). 
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caps,26 decriminalization27 (assuming that funding for indigent 
defense is not reduced), systemic litigation to force change,28 
and more rigorous standards for defense practice.29 Some of 
these responses focus on the legislative or executive branch, 
some focus on defender office response or regulation, while only 
a few focus on how the individual defender should respond to 
the crisis.30  
It is undisputed that indigent defense is an underfunded 
mandate and that public defenders31 have workloads that make 
                                                                                                     
 26. See REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 25, at 54 (“In 2009, the New 
York legislature passed a law requiring that . . . the state’s chief administrative 
judge establish caseload caps in New York City for trial-level defenders. The law 
also provides that the caseload caps should be phased in over a four-year period, 
with the understanding that the increased costs associated with the caps be 
borne by the State of New York.”). 
 27. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2008) (“[P]ossession of one 
ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an offender 
who is eighteen years of age or older to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars 
and forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of criminal or civil 
punishment or disqualification.”).  
 28. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellant at 21, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 
930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 8866-07), 2009 WL 6409871, at *21 
(complaining of “systemic deficiencies [that] create a severe or unacceptably 
high probability that indigent criminal defendants will receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel” in New York State). 
 29. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL 
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d. ed. 
2004) (promulgated by the American Bar Association to create standards 
relating to collateral consequences and discretionary disqualifications of 
convicted individuals); UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT 
(2010) (promulgated by Uniform Law Commission to encourage standards 
relating to collateral consequences in criminal cases). 
 30. In an earlier article, I focused on the lack of—and need for—
constitutional and professional standards for the delivery of effective assistance 
of counsel in misdemeanor cases. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 309−10. That 
article described the misdemeanor crisis and discussed the different 
institutional competencies of the legislature, the judiciary, professional 
organizations, and the defense bar in responding to it. See id. at 330. 
 31. I use the word “public defender” in the general, nontechnical sense, to 
include statewide public defender offices, non- or for-profits with contracts to 
provide indigent defense services, and panel attorneys doing indigent defense 
work. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 2 (describing three basic 
models for delivery of indigent defense services: the public defender, appointed 
counsel, and a bidding system); see also CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SERVICES, 1999, at 5 (2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf 
(describing various methods of delivering indigent defense representation). 
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effective representation of all clients difficult if not 
impossible.32 A small but vibrant literature debates whether and 
how public defenders should “triage” clients’ cases.33 There are 
various proposals for the method of triage, but all would focus 
limited resources on felonies and cut resources for “minor” 
misdemeanor cases. While there may be intuitive appeal to such 
an approach, it ignores a critical side effect of triage in favor of 
serious cases: allowing the misdemeanor system to continue to 
function in its current, harmful manner by depriving individuals 
charged with misdemeanors of effective means of fighting the 
charges against them.34 
What if indigent defense counsel triaged in favor of 
misdemeanor representation, and in particular focused on the 
“petty,” quality-of-life misdemeanors that flood the system and 
result in disproportionately harsh, permanent criminal records? 
What if defenders put sufficient resources into such cases so that 
clients felt they actually had the true choice of refusing to plead 
guilty? The response to such a proposal would surely parallel the 
negative response Alexander drew, including: it is unrealistic; 
clients facing serious felony charges would suffer; and criminal 
defense attorneys cannot reform the system on the backs of 
individual clients, some of whom may be better served with a 
quick guilty plea or other resolution in the lower courts.35 
Yet truly minor misdemeanors are precisely the types of 
cases in which a plea bargain is rarely much of a bargain for the 
defendant. For example, a defendant might be “offered” a 
sentence of time already served—which can mean the night spent 
in jail awaiting arraignment, or even a fictional time period if the 
person was never incarcerated—in exchange for pleading guilty 
                                                                                                     
 32. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 16–18 (discussing 
problems in indigent defense). 
 33. See infra Part IV.A (discussing triage literature). 
 34. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political 
Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 301 (1996) (“Lawyers influence and 
shape the practices and institutions in which they work, if only to reinforce and 
legitimate them.”). 
 35. Cf. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 
1119−20 (2008) (“For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case— . . . a 
recidivist facing petty charges—the best resolution is generally a quick plea in 
exchange for a light, bargained-for sentence.”). 
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to a misdemeanor of disorderly conduct.36 This may sound 
advantageous, or at least not harmful, until the actual 
consequences of this plea are added into the equation. This 
conviction can, and does, lead to proceedings to evict an 
individual from public housing.37 It can, and does, pose a bar to 
demonstrating “good moral conduct” for citizenship.38 Perhaps 
most significantly, in an era in which employers can, and do, 
easily access electronic criminal records,39 the person taking the 
“harmless” disorderly conduct plea will have difficulty finding 
work.40 Indeed, this employment issue alone starkly illustrates 
                                                                                                     
 36. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-201 (West 2002) (stating disorderly 
conduct is a misdemeanor). 
 37. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii)(A) (2010) (authorizing local public 
housing authorities to prohibit admission based on certain types of criminal 
activity). This includes criminal activity that “may threaten the health, safety, 
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents or persons 
residing in the immediate vicinity; or. . . the health or safety of the owner, 
property management staff, or persons performing a contract administration 
function or responsibility on behalf of” the public housing authority. Id. My 
clinic students have represented a client with a disorderly conduct conviction 
facing the loss of public housing based on that conviction. 
 38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006) (establishing a five-year period—which 
includes showing “good moral character”—for naturalization requirement); id. 
§ 1430(a) (establishing a three-year period showing “good moral character” as 
naturalization requirement for specific categories of applicants, including 
individuals married to and living with a U.S. citizen and individuals who 
obtained lawful permanent resident status as the battered spouse of a U.S. 
citizen). 
 39. In some states, these databases include both criminal and noncriminal 
convictions, and records of the initial charge. In Maryland, for example, the 
“Maryland Judiciary Case Search” database will reveal charges that resulted in 
a “stet” or “nolle prosequi,” (which are equivalent to dismissal), as well as those 
that ended in an acquittal. See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, MD. JUDICIARY, 
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp (last visited Apr. 
2, 2013) (providing “public access to the case records of the Maryland Judiciary”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). These nonconviction records 
will be expunged only upon affirmative application of the individual and 
payment of $30, provided there are no statutory bars to expungement (for 
example, a conviction following a dismissal means the earlier dismissal can 
never be expunged). See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (West 2012) 
(setting forth grounds for expungement in Maryland); MD. R. 4-504 (setting forth 
expungement procedures). In other states, such as New York, noncriminal 
convictions (such as for minor, nonpublic marijuana possession) or dispositions 
(such as deferred dismissals) will result in immediate or eventual automatic 
sealing of the record. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.55 (McKinney 2011). 
 40. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 
958 (2003) (describing her study showing serious negative effects of race and 
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the way in which the most minor misdemeanor conviction has 
serious implications for so many people.41 
The underlying goal of this Article’s proposal to focus 
defender resources on minor misdemeanors is to have more 
defendants choose trial over a guilty plea, or at least reject a 
quick, early guilty plea—understanding that declining to plead 
guilty may lead to trial, but may also lead to deferral or 
dismissal.42 More misdemeanor trials, or fewer guilty pleas at an 
early court appearance, would impose serious strain on the 
criminal justice system.43 If these costs filter down, prosecutors 
                                                                                                     
criminal record on employment prospects). The same is true for landlords’ access 
to public criminal records, and the resulting difficulty for an individual with 
such a record to find private housing. See Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not 
(Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of 
The Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 181 (2009) (“Increased 
landlord discrimination against housing applicants with criminal histories has 
made locating housing in the private market more challenging than ever for 
individuals with criminal records.”). 
 41. RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining that many 
employers of all types and sizes will not consider employees with a criminal 
record). 
 42. See Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact 
of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 867–
82 (1996) (describing his analysis of clinic student representation, which showed 
that a significant number of clinic clients who declined to plead guilty at 
arraignment later got dismissals, deferred dismissals, or plea offers to reduced 
charges); see also M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole Powell, Valuing Gideon’s 
Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 7−8) (discussing efforts of head of El Paso, Texas Public 
Defender’s office to raise the office’s low trial rates and describing how, while 
the efforts were a disappointment at first glance, a closer look at the data 
showed a high rate of dismissal of charges) (on file with author). While 
Hernandez, the head public defender, and Powell note that their data needs 
further study and analysis, they describe how, after instituting various 
programs to encourage more trials:  
In FY2011 and 2012 we obtained dismissals on almost one quarter of 
our felonies, more than one third of our misdemeanors, and one third 
of our juvenile cases. In prior years, [Hernandez] had only focused on 
trials and pleas, never on the best possible outcome, which is 
dismissal of charges. [Hernandez] was pleased. Also, while our trial 
rate was low, close to half resulted in acquittals. Moreover, 82% of all 
our adult cases were resolved favorably relative to the prosecutor’s 
initial plea-bargain offer. 
Id. 
 43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1969, 1976 (1992) (“More zealous defense means more evidence, more legal 
arguments, tenacious insistence on exercising every right.”); George Fisher, Plea 
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would be forced to decline prosecution in more cases. This may, in 
turn, affect law enforcement, potentially leading the police to 
exercise discretion in deciding whom they actually put through 
the system. Finally, making the system bear more of the true 
costs of adjudicating misdemeanor arrests would, hopefully, give 
legislators a concrete reason (and perhaps some political 
coverage) to decriminalize and to refrain from creating more 
minor criminal offenses. In these ways, zealous attention to 
misdemeanor representation—in addition to being one way of 
dealing directly with the misdemeanor crisis—may advance other 
methods of dealing with the misdemeanor crisis.  
Defense attorneys cannot force their clients to go to trial or 
decline to plead guilty; nor can they coerce clients to do so. But 
they can offer zealous representation that allows clients to make 
truly voluntary choices, and that representation can include an 
invitation (in appropriate cases) to participate in a collaborative 
effort to change the system by forcing it to bear some of the real 
costs of mass misdemeanor processing.44 Currently, the entire 
                                                                                                     
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 893−936 (2000) (“Prosecutors took up 
plea bargaining in part to escape the enormous [caseload] burdens of their 
office.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1950 (1992) (“In order to accommodate the dramatic increase in 
trials [caused by an abolition of plea bargaining], the trial process itself would 
have to be truncated.”). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 931, 1035 (1983) (“Indeed, the usual failure of prosecutors and trial 
judges [in Philadelphia] to seek pleas of guilty reflected their recognition that a 
nonjury trial often consumed fewer resources than the process of negotiating a 
guilty plea and of making the record that would justify its acceptance in the 
courtroom.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1037, 1040−41, 1047−50, 1053−86 (1984) (stating that “the inevitability of 
bargaining depends on the assumed need for bargaining, and the theory thus 
can be questioned to the extent that the ‘administrative need’ can be shown to 
be illusory”). 
 44. Inviting clients to participate in a coordinated effort to “crash” the 
system is cause lawyering, but properly done (e.g., not coercively) does not 
conflict with the client’s interest. For a thorough analysis of “cause lawyering” 
among criminal defense attorneys, see Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause 
Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause 
Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1197−98 (2005) (“Sometimes 
criminal defendants are better represented by defense attorneys who are ‘cause 
lawyers’ passionately seeking to advance their political and moral visions 
through the representation of their clients than by attorneys who have no 
overriding ‘cause’ other than the representation of the individual client.”). 
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system—including defense counsel in many instances, often due 
to a lack of resources—works to coerce guilty pleas and quick 
dispositions in the lower criminal courts. It is a system that 
violates professional, ethical, and constitutional norms on a daily 
basis, and a system in desperate need of reform.  
A defender focus on misdemeanor representation is an 
approach that admittedly has drawbacks, and one that might 
work only as a limited “experiment” in the right jurisdiction. It 
also clearly is not an option in jurisdictions that openly or 
indirectly violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
misdemeanor cases by failing to appoint counsel when the 
defendant is sentenced to an actual or suspended term of 
incarceration.45 This Article explores the idea of crashing the 
system as one potential response to the misdemeanor crisis, at a 
time when the lower courts are doing serious damage to 
individuals and to society by burdening millions of people with 
arrest and conviction records for minor offenses. Part II describes 
the potential role for defense counsel in making the criminal 
justice system feel the true cost of mass misdemeanor processing. 
Specific strategies for a defender office focus on misdemeanors, 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (finding that the 
Sixth Amendment bars imposition of suspended sentence that was entered 
following “uncounseled conviction”); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371−73 
(1979) (finding no right to counsel for sentence of fine); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person 
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). In one of the more 
blatant statements about violating the right to misdemeanor counsel, South 
Carolina’s chief justice called Alabama v. Shelton “one of the more misguided 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court”: 
If we adhered to it in South Carolina we would have the right to 
counsel probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to 
take these cases in every magistrate’s court in South Carolina, and I 
have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t have the resources 
to do that. So I will tell you straight up that we [are] not adhering to 
Alabama v. Shelton in every situation. 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 1, at 15; see also Erica Hashimoto, 
The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 
1023 (2013) (discussing certain jurisdictions’ failure or refusal to enforce 
Alabama v. Shelton). But see Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668−69 (noting how, under 
state laws or constitutions as of 2001, “[a]ll but 16 States . . . would provide 
counsel to a defendant . . . either because he received a substantial fine or 
because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense or provided 
for a maximum prison term of one year” (emphasis added)). 
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including specialized practice groups, are discussed in Part III. 
Part IV begins with an explanation of various existing proposals 
for public defender triage, and the argument against triage; it 
then considers and responds to likely arguments against any 
effort to crash the misdemeanor system. 
II. Defense Counsel’s Role in Making the Criminal Justice System 
Feel the True Cost of Mass Misdemeanor Processing 
Recently, the Bronx District Attorney’s (DA) office “quietly 
adopted” a new policy for misdemeanor trespass cases. Rather 
than filing charges based on a police officer’s written affidavit, 
with checked boxes to indicate allegedly unlawful conduct, 
prosecutors must now first interview the arresting officer to 
determine whether the arrest was lawful.46 This was a significant 
reform in a borough of a city where police made more than 16,000 
trespass arrests between 2009 and 2011.47 According to a Bronx 
DA Bureau Chief, the office “had received numerous complaints 
from defense lawyers who claimed that many of the people 
arrested were not trespassers.”48 Indeed, public defender offices 
are partners in federal court litigation filed to challenge the New 
York City Police Department’s trespass stop and arrest policies.49 
While it is difficult to assess the exact effect that lower court 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A1 (explaining the new trespass-case screening 
process). 
 47. Complaint at 26–27, Davis v. City of New York, 10 CIV. 699 SAS 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 4946243. 
 48. Goldstein, supra note 46, at A1. 
 49. See Complaint, supra note 47, at 3, 55–56 (lawsuit filed by various 
organizations and law firms, including The Legal Aid Society, New York City’s 
main indigent defense provider, alleging unconstitutionality of police 
department practices relating to trespass stops and arrests); see also Ligon v. 
City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274(SAS), 2012 WL 3597066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 21, 2012) (lawsuit filed by various organizations and law firms, including 
The Bronx Defenders, an indigent defense provider, challenging police 
department’s “abusive practices of stopping, questioning, searching, citing, and 
arresting residents of Clean Halls Buildings and their visitors without adequate 
cause”). The Legal Aid Society is also co-counsel in a lawsuit alleging violations 
relating to the police Department’s marijuana possession arrest practices. 
Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.P.D., No. 0451000-2012, 2012 WL 2362711, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012).  
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defense attorneys had, one thing is certain: “Trespass arrests in 
the Bronx have fallen 38.2%, year to date, compared with 2011.”50  
One of the attorneys involved at the inception of this 
coordinated effort wrote about his clinic students’ representation 
in a trespass trial he supervised: 
Dwayne’s acquittal marked the end of the Pace Clinic’s direct 
representation, but it was the beginning of the Clinic’s efforts 
to organize a citywide advocacy coalition to end this pattern of 
wrongful trespass arrests. Dwayne was one of twenty clients 
that Clinic students represented on criminal trespass charges. 
Fourteen of these cases were ultimately dismissed. Like 
Dwayne, many of our clients have become engaged in collective 
action against the over-policing of their neighborhoods.51 
When law school clinic students represent misdemeanor 
clients,52 those students have low caseloads, close supervision, 
ample resources, and the opportunity to collaborate with 
classmates. They have sufficient time to meet with the client and 
to investigate the law and facts by visiting the scene, obtaining 
911 calls and video surveillance, and interviewing witnesses. 
They file substantive, nonboilerplate motions and fully prepare 
                                                                                                     
 50. Goldstein, supra note 46, at A1. In the other boroughs of New York 
City, where there has yet to be prosecutorial action, trespass arrests are either 
down very slightly, or up considerably. Id. 
 51. M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in “Zero-
Tolerance” Policing Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 353 (2012) 
[hereinafter Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics]; see also M. Chris 
Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands Up to the NYPD’s Apartheid-
Like Trespassing Crackdown, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 30, 2007), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/full/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the representation of a client in a criminal trespass 
trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Law students act as “student-attorneys” under the particular 
jurisdiction’s rules governing student practice. In most jurisdictions, they can 
handle, with appropriate supervision, all aspects of a misdemeanor case. See, 
e.g., MD. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND, Rule 16 
(setting forth requirements relating to “legal assistance by law students” in 
Maryland). 
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for any potential sentencing proceeding.53 In short, these students 
offer high-quality representation in the lower criminal courts.54 
Obviously, a busy public defender cannot devote the same 
amount of time or resources that a clinic student devotes to each 
client. However, the example illustrates the effect such attentive 
clinic-student lawyering can have on clients. They are more willing 
to go to trial and less eager to take a quick guilty plea. Surely the 
reasons for this decision-making process and outcome are complex, 
but undoubtedly one reason is that for clinic clients, going to trial 
with an attorney who is prepared (if inexperienced) is a viable 
option.55 There is no subtle—or not-so-subtle—message from 
defense counsel of being too busy to handle this minor case properly. 
There is no message that taking a plea is no big deal, and that 
taking the plea early in the case is best. The result, at least in the 
jurisdictions where I have supervised my own and observed other 
student-attorneys, is that clinic students litigate pretrial issues 
more often and more aggressively, bargain with more information, 
and go to trial more in misdemeanor cases.56 Indeed, and rather 
depressingly, some prosecutors complain that clinic students are 
                                                                                                     
 53. They can also attend to the nondirect consequences of the criminal case, 
such as school suspension hearings or eviction from public housing. My students 
in the Criminal Justice Clinic at American University, Washington College of 
Law, have advocated in these and other noncriminal contexts for clients we also 
represent in the criminal case.  
 54. See Zeidman, supra note 42, at 870 (comparing the “overall outcomes 
from arraignment through final disposition” between law student 
representatives and defense attorneys in New York County misdemeanor cases). 
The comparison showed  
that students’ clients plead guilty far less often than do the clients of 
assigned counsel, and in cases where there is a plea, students’ clients 
were far more likely to plead to reduced charges, and far less likely to 
be sentenced to jail. Additionally, students achieved dismissals or 
[deferred dismissals] almost twice as often as did institutional 
defenders (44% versus 23%). 
Id.; see also Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics, supra note 51, at 
356 (stating that criminal defense clinic “[s]tudents are, and must be, deeply 
engrossed in mastering each step in the adjudication of a criminal case”). 
 55. Notably, clinic clients rarely raise concerns, particularly after the 
initial meeting with student-attorneys, about students’ lack of experience.  
 56. Steve Zeidman’s comparison of student-attorney and appointed counsel 
outcomes and performance parallels much of my anecdotal experience. See, e.g., 
Zeidman, supra note 42, at 905 (stating that “guilty pleas in cases handled by 
students reflect a higher percentage of charge reductions”). 
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pushing for trials to get experience, when they should be telling 
their clients to plead guilty because they are guilty. The narrative 
here is that the pendulum has in effect swung from coercing clients 
to plead guilty to coercing them to go to trial. These complaints 
ignore that only the client—and not the student—can decide to go 
to trial, and also refuse to acknowledge that some defendants 
actually choose trial over plea when that option is made clearly 
available to them. In fact, the pendulum has simply swung away 
from explicit or implicit coercion to plead guilty toward 
representation that allows defendants a truly knowing and 
voluntary choice about how to best proceed. 
The misdemeanor trial has almost disappeared in many 
jurisdictions, with some high-volume courts gaining more than 
99% of all misdemeanor convictions without trials.57 This is a 
central part of the misdemeanor crisis, and has allowed the 
current, overloaded lower courts to continue to function. The lack 
of adjudication of public order offenses is also a large part of the 
crisis in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, as the vast 
majority of individuals who experience that system receive the 
strong message that no institutional actor—judge, prosecutor, or 
even their assigned defense attorney—is concerned with the 
factual basis for a criminal charge or the legality of police conduct 
leading up to an arrest.58 
                                                                                                     
 57. See, e.g., NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 
5 (presenting New York City statistics). 
 58. As Roscoe Pound noted more than eighty years ago, and Malcolm 
Feeley more recently reminded us: 
It is [the handling of petty prosecutions] that the administration of 
criminal justice touches immediately the greatest number of 
people. . . . The bad physical surroundings, the confusion, the want of 
decorum, the undignified offhand disposition of cases at high speed, 
the frequent suggestion of something working behind the scenes, 
which characterize the petty criminal court in almost all of our cities, 
create in the minds of observers a general suspicion of the whole 
process of law enforcement which, no matter how unfounded, gravely 
prejudices the law.  
MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1979) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 190−91 (1930)); see also Howell, supra note 8, at 274−75 
(“Unfortunately for the criminal justice system and for the millions of people 
subjected to summary arrest each year for minor and noncriminal order-
maintenance offenses, the processing of minor offenses bears few of the 
hallmarks associated with perceptions of procedural fairness.”). 
1106 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013) 
III. Strategies for Focusing on Misdemeanors 
So what might a coordinated effort to crash the misdemeanor 
system look like? This section explores several strategies: a 
defender community focus on order-maintenance misdemeanors, 
meaning the petty, largely public-order-offense arrests that come 
out of zero-tolerance policing;59 the creation of specialized practice 
groups within a defender office for expertise and efficiency 
purposes; defender office-wide policies to advance quality 
misdemeanor representation, such as systems to collect 
information about particular police officers who frequently make 
petty offense arrests; and coordinated efforts to link focused petty 
misdemeanor representation to other strategies, such as impact 
litigation and community education, to move these cases out of the 
criminal justice system. The ways in which a particular defender 
office or group might choose to focus efforts on the lower criminal 
courts will vary by jurisdiction, and these strategies thus offer 
broad suggestions that may—or may not—be the right fit in a 
particular jurisdiction. 
A. Focusing on Public Order Offenses 
The types of minor misdemeanor arrests that come out of 
order-maintenance policing will vary by jurisdiction, but often 
include prosecutions for trespass, disorderly conduct, public 
urination or drunkenness, loitering, and marijuana possession.60 
These cases are charged in significant numbers across the nation. 
For example, in 2009 more than 45% of all drug arrests in the 
United States were for marijuana possession;61 in that same year, 
                                                                                                     
 59. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (describing “zero 
tolerance,” or “order-maintenance” policing).  
 60. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1666 (noting that “[m]any of the cases in 
the [lower] courts (perhaps the majority in most urban jurisdictions) are petty 
public order cases”).  
 61. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States: Arrests 
(Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/arrests/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (depicting data about drug abuse violations throughout the United 
States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This percentage 
includes felony and misdemeanor marijuana possession, as the FBI does not 
separate the two categories. Id. 
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“there were 8,067 gambling arrests, 26,380 vagrancy arrests, 
471,727 drunkenness arrests, 518,374 disorderly conduct arrests, 
and 89,733 curfew and loitering arrests.”62  
In trying fiscal times, these are the types of cases in which 
proper representation—that impose the real cost of mass 
misdemeanor processing—could put pressure on legislators to 
decriminalize and prosecutors to decline to prosecute. Indeed, such 
movement has already happened in some jurisdictions. Supporters 
of the successful November 2012 ballot measures to legalize 
personal marijuana possession and use in Colorado and 
Washington stressed that “the laws will end thousands of small-
scale drug arrests while freeing law enforcement to focus on larger 
crimes” and “estimate[d] that taxing marijuana will bring in 
millions of dollars of new revenue for governments, and will save 
court systems and police departments additional millions.”63  
Minor misdemeanors are also good candidates for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion in declining to file charges. In California 
in 2009, Sacramento and Contra Costa prosecutors announced 
plans to stop prosecuting certain misdemeanors, including many 
minor public order offenses, in the face of severe budget cuts.64 A 
memo from the Sacramento District Attorney listed petty theft, 
                                                                                                     
 62. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the United States: Table 
29 (Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (listing numerical data about the number of arrests in 
various categories in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR 
LAW & POLICY, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 
BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 1 
(2010) (“In some courts, the combination of [the three misdemeanors of] driving 
with a suspended license, possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of 
alcohol cases can total between 40% and 50% of the caseload.”). 
 63. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal 
Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 94C, § 32L (2008) (decriminalizing marijuana); MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE 
WASTE, supra note 1, at 28 (describing King County, Washington’s program for 
diversion of driving-while-suspended cases). In this program, individuals 
worked off underlying fines that led to suspension in exchange for dismissal of 
the criminal charges. Id. The first months of the program showed a reduction of 
eighty-four percent in prosecutorial filings in suspension cases and a reduction 
of twenty-four percent in jail costs. Id. 
 64. See Jesse McKinley, Money Shortages Force Cuts in Cases to be 
Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A13 (giving statements from the 
Sacramento County District Attorney and Contra Costa County District 
Attorney discussing plans to stop prosecuting certain minor crimes). 
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public drunkenness, and minor drug possession as candidates for 
declination, and “[d]istrict attorneys in many parts of the country 
say they are considering prosecutorial rollbacks, including opting 
not to try some minor crimes . . . and seeking to divert more 
defendants to so-called community court systems.”65 While these 
threats, obviously closely tied to efforts to retain funding,66 have 
not often been carried out, such proposals highlight concerns with 
the costs of the lower criminal courts and potential openness to 
reform. This makes it an opportune time to focus defender 
resources on the types of cases that legislators and prosecutors 
might agree should be moved out of the system altogether, should 
they prove too costly. 
Currently, and counterintuitively, petty misdemeanors are 
the types of charges least likely to get prosecutorial scrutiny. 
Josh Bowers has analyzed data showing that: 
Iowa prosecutors declined [to file charges in] public order 
offenses at a substantially lower rate than any other offense 
category . . . . Specifically, violent felonies and misdemeanors 
were declined almost three times as often as public order 
felonies and misdemeanors. And all felonies were declined over 
fourteen times as often as all simple misdemeanors.67  
Bowers found similar data in New York City, with the lowest 
rates of declination of charges in public order offense cases.68 This 
is likely due in part to the high volume of petty misdemeanors in 
some jurisdictions, particularly busy urban courts, making it 
difficult for lower court prosecutors to adequately screen such 
cases. It is undoubtedly also due to the high percentage of “quick-
and-dirty pleas with minimal resource outlay” in petty 
prosecutions, making the defender community complicit in the 
continued movement of these cases.69 These are the cases most in 
need of defense scrutiny and focus.  
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. (noting that the Contra Costa prosecutor eventually “cut his own 
salary to avoid putting the plan in place”).  
 66. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Facing Cuts, a City Repeals Its Domestic 
Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A11 (describing how Topeka, Kansas 
prosecutor “said he was forced to not prosecute any misdemeanors and to focus 
on felonies because the County Commission cut his budget”). 
 67. Bowers, supra note 11, at 1716. 
 68. See id. at 1718. 
 69. See id. at 1716. 
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Finally, public order offenses may be less controversial as a 
focus of a coordinated defender community and defendant effort 
than other types of offenses, because they are usually victimless. 
They are generally malum prohibitum, or wrong only because the 
law says so, and they are the result of discretionary arrests (as 
compared to, say, a domestic violence arrest in a mandatory-
arrest jurisdiction). When someone is arrested for such an 
offense, it represents a deliberate choice of police resources (for 
example, sending officers in to do a “vertical sweep” of a public 
housing building, resulting in a number of trespass arrests). 
There are a number of reasons to focus defender resources on 
public order offenses in an attempt to encourage more defendants 
to reject early guilty pleas and to go to trial. While it may seem 
counterintuitive to use scarce resources on minor cases, there are 
potential long-term benefits for all defendants and for society in 
the rigorous defense of individuals charged with public order 
offenses. 
B. Specialized Misdemeanor Practice Groups 
For purposes of expertise and efficiency, defender offices 
might assign attorneys to particular categories of offense, for 
example creating a “marijuana possession practice group” or a 
“loitering practice group.” While this would require transferring 
certain cases from the arraigning defense counsel to the practice 
group counsel, thus moving away from vertical representation in 
offices that use a vertical model, there would be substantial 
advantages to a specialized group approach.70  
Specialization would allow attorneys to quickly become 
experts in constitutional, statutory, and evidentiary issues in the 
particular type of case. As Justice Douglas noted in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin:71  
                                                                                                     
 70. For attorney development reasons, and because an order-maintenance 
misdemeanor focus would encompass only some cases in lower court, offices 
might have only a certain amount of each attorney’s caseload in the specialized 
area, with the remainder of cases more randomly assigned for diversity of 
caseload. 
 71. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
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We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional 
questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex 
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. The 
trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief 
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often 
bristle with thorny constitutional questions.72 
Disorderly conduct cases raise potential free speech issues, and 
trespass trials are replete with evidentiary and statutory issues, 
as well as constitutional ones. For example, a recent clinic 
trespass case led to the students’ preparation on the following: 
whether the police officer could testify about prior notice of his 
warning to the defendant to stay away from the location in the 
case or instead whether the prosecution was required to produce 
the written warning; whether a general warning to stay away 
from a store encompassed the sidewalk in front of the store so as 
to provide sufficient notice of trespass under the relevant statute; 
and whether the prosecution could rely on testimony from either 
the police officer or an agent for a strip mall to prove that the 
officer had the statutorily required authority to arrest for 
trespassing at a privately rented store within the strip mall. 
Garnering such expertise for future cases allows defense counsel 
to properly challenge unlawful arrests, to hold the prosecution to 
its burden, and to offer clients the option of a trial with several 
potential lines of defense. 
Specialization is a more efficient use of defender time, as 
issues tend to repeat themselves within particular categories of 
cases. Such efficiency has the added benefit of giving attorneys 
more time for the type of client counseling that must be central to 
an approach that stresses trial rights over guilty pleas and 
encourages clients to seriously consider refusing guilty pleas in 
appropriate cases. 
C. Office-Wide Policies to Advance Quality Lower Court 
Representation 
Some strategies for working towards more minor 
misdemeanor trials, or at least fewer guilty pleas, will cut across 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).  
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all types of cases. For example, defenders should refrain from 
advising unincarcerated clients to accept plea bargains at the 
first court appearance, on the grounds that such guilty pleas 
violate professional and ethical standards requiring investigation 
in all criminal cases.73 Defense counsel has a clear duty to inform 
clients about any plea offers,74 and clients are free to enter a 
guilty plea at the first appearance should they so choose,75 but 
counsel should also make each client fully aware of the 
consequences of any plea and the option of rejecting an early plea 
with the goal of trial or of a later, potentially more advantageous, 
disposition.76 This would include clearly informing clients about 
the myriad formal and informal collateral consequences of even a 
minor misdemeanor conviction,77 thus giving the client true 
knowledge about the consequences of a quick guilty plea and the 
benefits to fighting the charges.  
Giving individuals facing misdemeanor charges a real 
opportunity for voluntary decision-making about going to trial 
recognizes that the current misdemeanor system is replete with 
coercion points, pushing defendants towards quick, uninformed 
                                                                                                     
 73. Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the 
Prosecution, 32 FORD. URB. L.J. 315, 331 n.86 (2005) (“Pleas at arraignments fly 
directly in the face of the lawyer’s constitutional and ethical duty to 
investigate.” (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-4.1, 4-6.1 (1980))); see also Norman L. 
Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado About What We Do—And What Prosecutors 
and Judges Should Not Do, 36 APR CHAMPION 7, 8 (2012) (critiquing “meet ’em 
and plead ’em” practices); NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 17, at 29 (noting that almost half of all New York City misdemeanors are 
resolved at arraignment).  
 74. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (finding a Sixth 
Amendment duty to communicate formal plea offers to client). 
 75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (“In a criminal 
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the 
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered. . . .”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Std. 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993) (“Certain decisions relating to the 
conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for 
defense counsel.”). The decisions to be made by the accused, after full 
consultation with counsel, include: “(i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to accept 
a plea agreement.” Id.  
 76. See Zeidman, supra note 42, at 867–82 (describing how clinic clients 
who declined to plead guilty early in the case often received dismissals or better 
offers at a later point). 
 77. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 297−303 (describing minor convictions 
that lead to major collateral consequences). 
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guilty pleas. Defense counsel has an obligation to counter these 
coercion points. That countering can come in a variety of forms, 
such as assuring the client that counsel is fully prepared to try 
the case, rather than suggesting that a guilty plea is “better” 
when that suggestion is at least partly based on counsel’s own 
triage concerns. Only in this way can defenders achieve truly 
client-centered misdemeanor representation, namely by giving 
individuals the tools and assistance they need to avoid minor 
convictions with major consequences. When Michelle Alexander, 
in her Crash the System editorial, wrote that “mass incarceration 
depends almost entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to 
control,” the cooperation she was critiquing came in the form of 
guilty pleas taken under circumstances that can hardly be 
defined as knowing and voluntary.78 In the lower criminal courts, 
this means clients trying to talk to counsel for the first time in 
the hallway as counsel runs between courtrooms, and having an 
“offer” to plead guilty pushed forward when the client does not 
trust counsel enough to discuss fears of deportation, loss of the 
family’s public housing, or potential plans for college next year 
that depend on an ability to get financial aid. Refusing to 
encourage, and indeed generally discouraging, guilty pleas at the 
first appearance is a seemingly small step that will go a long way 
to dissipating some of this coercion. 
Defender offices, as some already do, should develop systems 
to collect and make internally available information about police 
officers focused on quality-of-life arrests, in order to see patterns 
and more easily expose “testilying.”79 This is particularly 
important in public order offenses, in which police testimony is 
usually the only evidence. Such systems offer significant potential 
benefits to lower court practice because discovery is often meager 
and late. Even in “open file” discovery jurisdictions, prosecutors 
may not have relevant police or laboratory reports—and may 
                                                                                                     
 78. Alexander, supra note 20, at SR 5. 
 79. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 
836 (2008) (“In New York, the Mollen Commission found that perjury was ‘so 
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: ‘testilying.’’” 
(quoting COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF N.Y., COMMISSION 
REPORT 36 (1994) (Milton Mollen (Chair) and citing Joe Sexton, New York Police 
Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A1)). 
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claim that they do not have time to get them—before the trial 
date. The result is that many defendants plead guilty before 
getting any discovery, including any potential exculpatory 
material.80 Internal defender systems that expose patterns of 
improper police conduct could lead to use of such evidence at trial 
or in pretrial advocacy; the negative repercussions of public 
exposure of such evidence might encourage more careful 
prosecutorial analysis of public order cases and better decision-
making by police officers in forwarding such cases to 
prosecutors.81 Further, demanding discovery and following up on 
those demands in minor misdemeanor cases could significantly 
advance lower court practice norms, thus imposing more of the 
true costs of mass misdemeanor processing on the criminal 
justice system. 
D. Supplementing Defender Focus on Misdemeanors with Other 
Strategies for Reform of the Lower Criminal Courts 
In order to force change in the lower courts, this Article’s 
proposal of a trial-level focus on minor misdemeanor 
representation should be supplemented with other strategies. 
These might include: impact litigation to challenge particular 
offenses or particular police practices, such as the Bronx trespass 
litigation described above;82 impact litigation to challenge 
                                                                                                     
  80. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); see 
also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (holding that defendants have no 
due process right to impeachment information about government witnesses 
prior to entering a guilty plea, but leaving open the question of whether there is 
such a right for nonimpeachment exculpatory evidence). 
 81. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing Bronx 
District Attorney’s institution of more rigorous screening of trespass arrests 
after defense bar complained about improper police conduct in such arrests). 
 82. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing recent trends 
in trespass arrests made by the New York City Police Department); see also 
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of unlicensed general vending misdemeanor as 
applied to visual artists exhibiting or selling their work in public places); 
Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics, supra note 51, at 363 
(describing the Pace Law School criminal defense “Clinic’s experience leveraging 
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inadequate indigent defender systems;83 decriminalization efforts, 
which might be nudged along by higher costs that a defense 
community trial-level focus would impose on the system; media 
advocacy; and community education.84 Indeed, these other 
strategies are critical for change in the lower criminal courts and 
this Article’s proposal is not intended to stand on its own. The 
proposal of focusing defender resources on petty misdemeanors is, 
however, a critical component of reforming the lower courts—and 
one that not only is missing with the current dismal state of 
representation in many misdemeanor cases, but is ignored as a 
viable method of helping to solve the misdemeanor crisis.  
IV. A Different Conception of Triage: In Favor of Minor 
Misdemeanors 
There is little disagreement that indigent defense providers 
face overwhelming workloads, and that this has a severely 
negative effect on their clients.85 There is a body of literature that 
works from the assumption that high workloads are here to stay 
                                                                                                     
[its] misdemeanor docket to work towards ending the pattern of wrongful 
trespass arrests in New York City,” and noting that the clinic’s “work involved a 
combination of litigation strategies in Criminal Court, impact litigation, and 
legislative advocacy”). 
 83. See Cara Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 440−75 (2009) (discussing suits raising 
systemic challenges to indigent defense systems); see also Martin Guggenheim, 
The People’s Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 400 (2012) (“Separation of powers, which has long been a 
shield preventing courts from overseeing indigent defender systems, is instead a 
sword by which courts are authorized to decide for themselves whether indigent 
defender systems are adequate to allow courts to perform their constitutionally-
assigned function.”). 
 84. See MELANCA CLARK & EMILY SAVNER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
COMMUNITY ORIENTED DEFENSE: STRONGER PUBLIC DEFENDERS 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/community_ 
oriented_defender_network (“The Brennan Center founded the Community 
Oriented Defender (COD) Network to support defenders and their allies who 
seek more effective ways to carry out the defense function.”). “Our goal is to 
enable defense counsel to engage community based institutions in order to 
reduce unnecessary contact between individuals and the criminal justice 
system.” Id. 
 85. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 12, at 38 (detailing the 
crisis in indigent defense systems across United States). 
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and in need of a rational response—namely, a principled system 
of triage.86 Arguments in favor of a system of triage that 
diminishes representation for minor misdemeanors are, 
effectively, arguments to shrink Gideon.87 Focusing on 
misdemeanor representation, with the goal of fewer guilty pleas 
and more trials so as to impose the true cost of mass 
misdemeanor processing, is an attempt to shrink the overloaded, 
unjust lower criminal courts. 
A. The Debate over Public Defender Triage 
As Darryl Brown has explained his view, the courts establish 
and define the constitutional entitlement of the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, and the legislature then 
underfunds indigent defense so that the entitlement cannot be 
realized.88 These “[f]unding decisions, in effect, delegate to trial 
attorneys and judges the job of rationing rights. That is, these 
actors have the job of choosing which of the formal entitlements 
courts have created will see practical implementation, and in 
which cases.”89 Critiquing as unrealistic an approach that calls 
for “uncompromising zealous advoca[cy]” for all criminal 
defendants,90 those calling for triage instead find a stark reality: 
“The choice in underfunded systems is not between zealous 
advocacy and rights rationing. It is between haphazard, ad hoc 
rationing and thoughtful, well-conceived allocation.”91  
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Essay, Rationing Criminal Defense 
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 
807 (2004) (describing the likelihood that high workloads will be persistent and 
responding that a principled system of triage would be a rational answer). 
 87. See infra Parts IV.A.1−3 (describing various triage proposals that 
essentially result in less misdemeanor representation). 
 88. See Brown, supra note 86, at 807. 
 89. Id. The triage idea builds on the important work of William Stuntz. See 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (explaining that legislatures limit 
defense funding in part as a response to judicial overregulation of the criminal 
justice system and that “[u]nderfunding of criminal defense counsel limits the 
number of procedural claims that can be pressed”). 
 90. Brown, supra note 86, at 821 n.72 (citing MONROE H. FREEDMAN, 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 65–86 (1990)). 
 91. Id. at 828; see also id. at 808 (“[U]nderfunding of criminal defense is, in 
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If one accepts that defenders must (and will) ration 
resources, and that a principled system for doing so is preferable 
to an ad-hoc response, the next step is determining the 
principles for rationing.92 Scholars have offered different 
                                                                                                     
effect, a permanent feature of American criminal justice.”); Erica J. Hashimoto, 
The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 475 
(2007) [hereinafter Hashimoto, The Price] (“[T]hat indigent defense counsel 
caseloads are unacceptably high and that the quality of representation will 
continue to suffer until those caseloads become more manageable—are 
relatively uncontroversial.”). But see Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the 
Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a 
Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 936 (2010) (commenting that 
Brown’s “proposal, even if logically justifiable and plausible as a professional 
goal of public defenders, can provide no practical guidance that would 
meaningfully offset inadequate resources”). “Moreover, the apparent promise for 
more efficient allocation of resources can undermine arguments for adequate 
defense funding by suggesting that the priority cases can be defended well only 
if defenders focus their efforts on clearly observable pretrial indicators of likely 
innocence.” Id. Another approach to rationing is based on the belief that “hardly 
anyone in the society would want to devote the resources needed to bring us 
even close to a state in which rights could be generally enforced.” William H. 
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1988); 
see also id. at 1093 (“[T]he prevailing approaches to legal ethics should be 
faulted, not for failing to guarantee full access to the legal system, but for failing 
to contribute to an appropriate distribution of this necessarily scarce resource.”). 
Monroe Freedman and others have critiqued Simon’s views, although discussion 
of that lively debate is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Monroe H. 
Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers’ Ethics, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 91, 91 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, A Critique] (discussing the author’s 
disagreement with Simon’s views). 
 92. The literature on criminal defense triage builds on a well-developed 
body of work examining triage in the civil poverty law context. For example, 
Paul Tremblay has suggested principles for screening potential clients in his 
examination of the ethics of legal services triage that include: “legal success” 
(when resources can make a difference); “conservation” (cases requiring 
“proportionally smaller amounts” of the law office’s benefits to succeed); 
“collective benefit” (cases likely to affect a large number of people); “attending to 
the most serious legal matters” (when representation can ameliorate great 
“pain, discomfort, or harm” of a client); and “long-term benefit over short-term 
relief” (as a subset of the seriousness principle). Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A 
Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 
2490−92 (1999); see also Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A 
Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 281, 360−63 (1982) (discussing rationing 
principles); Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 1529, 1536−42 (1995) (same); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-
Based Ethic for Legal Service Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1103 n.7 (1990) 
(“Scarcity is inherent in legal services work. . . . [T]he presence of any fixed 
budget inevitably creates allocation choices, and without the usual market or 
price mechanisms some allocation methodology must be used.”). This civil 
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models,93 falling into three general categories: innocence- and 
stakes-based triage; a multicategory approach that takes 
innocence, “seriousness of case,” and protection of the justice 
system into account; and a straightforward “seriousness of case” 
triage. A fourth category offers an ethical justification—that 
includes a pragmatic proposal—for refusing to triage. 
1. Innocence- and Stakes-Based Triage 
Brown’s triage approach “urges factual innocence as a 
predominant concern of criminal procedure over other competing 
goals, such as regulation of police conduct.”94 This approach is 
unapologetic in denying effective representation to some in order 
to provide it to others. For example, a busy defender with two 
clients—one with a suppression motion with merit and the other 
“more likely to be innocent”—would forgo the motion in favor of 
concentrating scarce resources on the potentially innocent client, 
“even if the latter’s chances of ultimate success are lower.”95  
                                                                                                     
poverty law literature builds, in turn, on philosophical debates over ethical 
decision-making in situations of crisis or scarcity. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU, 
MAKING MORTAL CHOICES 5–37 (1997) (outlining the ethical problems and 
questions related to resource scarcity); EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: 
RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW 71 (1981) (same). Recognizing 
this important foundational work, this Article focuses on the criminal defense 
triage literature. 
 93. See e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding 
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2013) (“[W]e must 
shrink the universe of cases covered by Gideon to preserve its core. That would 
mean excluding nonjury misdemeanors and perhaps probationary sentences 
from its ambit.”); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real about Gideon: The Next Fifty 
Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1336 
(2013) (stating “[b]udget constraints and excessive caseloads have made triage 
an essential component of modern public defense”). 
 94. Brown, supra note 86, at 808 (noting that “[t]he specifics of [his 
proposed rationing] approach adapt insights from recent research on the causes 
of wrongful convictions”). Brown acknowledges that “[t]here are certainly 
jurisdictions in which funding levels are so low that rationing cannot be done in 
any meaningful manner; there simply is not enough to ration.” Id. at 815 
(describing Quitman County, Mississippi). His triage proposal would also not 
apply where there is “adequate funding of some locales that calls merely for 
ordinary lawyering decisions about allocation of resources.” Id. at 816. His 
approach would apply only in the “large middle range.” Id. 
 95. Id. at 821. One might question Brown’s statement that “[b]eyond its 
intuitive normative appeal, an approach giving priority to factual innocence 
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In addition to factual innocence, Brown would ration in favor 
of “charges and clients who have the most at stake or are likely to 
gain the greatest life benefit.”96 The “most at stake” principle 
means restricting Argersinger rights—namely, the right to 
counsel in misdemeanor cases in which the defendant is 
sentenced to actual or suspended incarceration97—to “the extent 
necessary to make Gideon more meaningful.”98 In other words, 
the large majority of individuals facing criminal charges, those 
facing low-level offenses, “get deliberately poorer representation 
and thus face a greater likelihood of conviction and punishment 
than they otherwise would.”99 Tempering this seemingly bright 
line between what he describes as high- and low-stakes cases, 
Brown notes how in some instances a defender might devote more 
resources to an individual facing minor charges but with a good 
chance of acquittal or lower sentence.100 This, however, is an 
                                                                                                     
draws its legitimacy from both core constitutional values and its correlation 
with plausible assumptions about legislative preferences.” Id. at 817. While it is 
true that language in some of the major right-to-counsel cases—including 
Powell v. Alabama, Gideon, and the Argersinger line of cases—defines the core 
role of defense counsel as protecting innocent clients against wrongful 
incarceration, later cases such as Padilla v. Kentucky, Lafler v. Cooper, and 
Missouri v. Frye offer a different conception of defense counsel, namely one that 
focuses on effective representation relating to guilty pleas. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2012) (stating that “negotiation of a plea 
bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 
(2012) (same); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (“During plea 
negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent 
counsel.’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). In 
addition, ethical rules binding defense lawyers require zealous advocacy for all 
clients, not only those clients “likely to be innocent,” and professional standards 
similarly conceive defense counsel as attuned to the client’s needs and goals, 
irrespective of guilt or innocence. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing interpretation of 
zealous representation norm in Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 96. Brown, supra note 86, at 818.  
 97. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (holding that it violates 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to imprison a person for any uncounseled 
conviction, absent a valid waiver of the right); see also supra note 45 and 
accompanying text (citing post-Argersinger cases). 
 98. Brown, supra note 86, at 818.  
 99. Id. (“Rationing defense services means a higher risk of error in some 
cases, and that risk should be allocated toward parties with less to lose.”). 
 100. See id. at 818–19 (“It is often better to put resources toward a project 
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exception to a rule of rationing that would generally give priority 
to clients facing more serious charges. 
Brown is not naïve about the potential pitfalls of having 
public defenders—who are overwhelmed and hampered by 
cognitive biases—making quick, early decisions about their 
clients’ potential innocence.101 Still, he would prefer even such 
potentially flawed decision-making to a completely ad hoc 
method. One critical omission from Brown’s examination of 
potential pitfalls in his triage proposal is that these practical and 
cognitive obstacles to determining innocence are exaggerated in 
misdemeanor representation. Defense counsel in the lower 
criminal courts have higher caseloads than their felony 
counterparts, and less access to external information through 
discovery. A large percentage of misdemeanor cases (such as drug 
cases or public order offenses) rest solely on the word of law 
enforcement, making the likelihood of a cognitive bias in favor of 
the police in a “client said, police said” type of case particularly 
high, even by defense counsel. In the lower courts, there is almost 
no time to step back and carefully review the case for likely 
innocence, and the pressure of the context may exacerbate 
already strong cognitive biases.102  
                                                                                                     
with a high chance of reducing small harms than a small chance of preventing a 
great harm.”). 
 101. See id. at 826–27 (discussing various cognitive biases that likely affect 
attorneys making resource allocation judgments, but remaining convinced that 
the innocence basis for rationing is still defensible). A major problem with 
Brown’s proposed triage system is that it expects defense counsel to somehow 
sort through and separate out the likely innocent clients from the guilty clients. 
See id. at 816. First, how will defense counsel who has more clients than she can 
effectively handle do this sorting? Surely it should not be based on gut instinct, 
but often—and particularly in jurisdictions where there is restrictive discovery 
so that defense counsel has little information at the inception of the case—that 
is largely what defense counsel has to work with. Brown notes this chicken-and-
egg problem with his triage proposal. See id. (discussing the application of his 
proposal). Indeed, although he finds that in the end defense counsel is up to the 
task of sorting likely innocent from likely guilty clients early in the case, his 
critique is so strong as to be a convincing argument against his proposed system 
of evidence-based triage. See id. at 820 (“All of these are complicated judgments 
to be sure, and in practice will sometimes be made quite roughly. But they are 
not different in kind from the judgments defense attorneys have long made 
when faced with resource constraints . . . .”). 
 102. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).  
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2. Multicategory Triage Approach (with a Focus on Innocence) 
John Mitchell, in an early ethical and philosophical inquiry, 
noted how despite various theories of the role of defense counsel 
in the lower criminal courts, “the defender’s work is better 
described by the medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos—
triage.”103 Mitchell’s view is that the need to triage does not 
necessarily lead to violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.104 Instead, he suggests that defense counsel divide 
misdemeanor cases into those requiring “focus,” and those in 
which only “pattern representation” is needed, both meeting the 
constitutional floor.105 
Mitchell proposes one catch-all and two specific categories of 
cases in which clients would get “focused representation,” 
meaning zealous representation that meets ethical and 
professional standards above the bare minimum required by the 
Sixth Amendment: (1) serious cases, meaning first priority to “the 
factually innocent” and secondary priority to individuals “facing 
extreme sentences or collateral legal consequences”; (2) “cases 
implicating system protection,” for example, cases presenting 
issues of “legally insufficient evidence, determinative evidentiary 
or procedural issues, [and] clear overcharging”; and (3) the catch-
all of “concrete injustice,” which Mitchell describes as “cases that 
touch the heart and gut,” using the example of a pregnant client 
trying to clean up her life (so long as this category is rarely used 
                                                                                                     
 103. John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1215, 1225 (1994). Mitchell’s article 
considers four central, recurring principles for making rationing 
decisions as potential tools for developing a rationing regime for 
defenders in the lower courts. It then analyzes each to determine 
what guidance each can provide for allocating our scarce resource of 
focus in the lower criminal courts. The four principles are as follows: 
1. Greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism); 2. Help 
those with the greatest need (egalitarianism); 3. Queues, randomness 
(egalitarianism); 4. Let the market decide (merit). 
Id. at 1252. 
 104. See id. at 1245–46 (“To avoid misunderstanding, one should recognize 
that this latter approach (pattern representation) is one which, as will be 
explained later, fulfills the Sixth Amendment and frequently leads to favorable 
results for the client.”). 
 105. Id. at 1246–48; see also id. at 1245–46. 
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and the attorney using it “continues to sincerely examine and 
question her cultural biases.”).106 
Significantly, and relevant to this Article’s proposal, Mitchell 
notes how “focused representation” in the categories of cases he 
identifies will result in changes in prosecutorial behavior:  
Legal-insufficiency cases and most factual-innocence ones will 
drop out as prosecutors begin to respond to defenders’ 
willingness to push those cases and their general success when 
they do. This in turn may well lead the prosecutor to more 
carefully screen cases at the inception and not even charge 
such cases in the first place, as well as not overcharge.107 
While this is an important benefit of “focused representation,” 
Mitchell’s description of the “pattern representation” that most 
lower court defendants would receive gives one pause: “‘Pattern 
representation’ means quickly categorizing cases legally, 
factually, strategically, and predictively by corresponding certain 
salient features of a case to recurring patterns the defender has 
abstracted from the masses of cases in which all fellow defenders 
have been involved.”108 As Monroe Freedman has noted, this 
description is “strikingly similar to the inquisitorial system of 
judging.”109  
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 1288–90; cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justification: 
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1278 
(1993) (“A[] potential danger of empathy is that it can lead to problematic 
allocation of resources. . . . In a situation of extremely limited attorney 
resources, . . . [t]he time that I spend getting to know my clients, listening to 
their stories, helping them find jobs, is time that I could spend representing 
others.”). 
 107. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 1291. 
 108. Id. at 1293. 
 109. Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 915 (2005) [hereinafter Freedman, Ethical Manifesto] 
(describing Fuller’s critique of the “pattern approach” used in inquisitorial 
systems and his view that an “adversarial presentation . . . [is] ‘the only effective 
means for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms 
of the familiar that which is not yet known’” (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The 
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed., 
1971))). 
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3. Triage Based on Case Seriousness: Cutting Back on 
Misdemeanor Representation 
A very different method of rationing is simply to deny 
counsel to a subset of individuals charged with misdemeanors on 
the theory that we can identify types of cases in which defense 
counsel does not provide any benefit to the individual. Like 
Mitchell and Brown, Erica Hashimoto offers a solution to her 
foundational observation that “[o]utrageously excessive caseloads 
have compromised the quality of indigent defense 
representation.”110 Criticizing jurisdictions that “force counsel to 
direct significant attention to low-level misdemeanor cases,”111 
Hashimoto presents data supporting her claim that appointed 
counsel “do not appear to provide significant benefit to the[se] 
defendants;” she thus focuses on “ways in which a state could 
limit appointment in those cases.”112  
Hashimoto examined misdemeanors in federal court from 
2000 to 2005 and found that pro se defendants—some 64% of the 
misdemeanor defendants in the data—were much less likely than 
represented defendants to enter a guilty plea and much more 
likely to get a dismissal or an acquittal in a bench trial.113 This 
data also revealed that pro se defendants fared significantly 
better than represented defendants in sentencing outcomes.114 
Hashimoto acknowledges limitations in her data, for example 
noting that federal court misdemeanor outcomes may not 
accurately predict state court misdemeanor outcomes, and that 
the relatively low numbers of pro se defendants in federal 
misdemeanor proceedings may lead “federal judges [to] make 
                                                                                                     
 110. Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 464. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 465. 
 113. Id. at 490 tbl.2. 
 114. Id. at 491. In a related study examining state court felonies, Hashimoto 
found that “at the state court level, felony defendants representing themselves 
at the time their cases were terminated appear to have achieved higher felony 
acquittal rates than their represented counterparts in that they were less likely 
to have been convicted of felonies.” Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of 
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. 
L. REV. 423, 428 (2007). 
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more accommodations to ensure that the rights of those 
defendants are protected.”115 
Working from this admittedly limited data, Hashimoto 
proposes “four steps that states can take to limit appointment of 
counsel to those cases in which the need for appointment is most 
justified”: 
First, states that currently provide a statutory right to counsel 
in all misdemeanor cases—regardless of penalty—should 
amend their statutes so that the defendant’s statutory right to 
counsel mirrors the federal constitutional right to counsel. 
Second, states should modify penalties for some minor offenses 
so that those offenses do not give rise to a right to counsel. 
Third, states should alter the structure of probation so that 
the imposition of a probationary sentence does not give rise to 
a right to counsel. Finally, states should establish procedures 
so that determinations regarding potential sentences in 
misdemeanor cases are made at the outset of the case.116 
Pointing out how these steps will lead to fewer clients for 
indigent defense providers, Hashimoto importantly urges states 
to adopt specific, numerical caseload limitations so that decreased 
case numbers actually lead to lower defense workloads.117 
Hashimoto’s proposal gives short shrift to the collateral 
consequences of misdemeanor convictions. She notes how 
misdemeanor convictions can lead to sentence enhancement in a 
later case and possible immigration consequences for noncitizens, 
but states that “all of these consequences, in addition to a loss of 
liberty, are threatened in more serious cases. To the extent that a 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 494; see also id. at 495 
(noting how defendants with weak or minor charges against them may be less 
likely to retain or request appointed counsel). 
 116. Id. at 467, 497–503. 
 117. Id. at 467, 504–13 (discussing recommendations to states regarding 
caseload limitations). Hashimoto claims that “[t]wo factors—the rise in total 
number of cases requiring appointment of counsel and the inadequacy of 
indigent defense budgets—have led to the current caseload crisis.” Id. at 475. 
Although she briefly notes the recent exponential growth in cases prosecuted in 
state and local courts, see id. at 481–82 (describing a “sharp rise in the number 
of narcotics prosecutions” and “increases in misdemeanor prosecutions”), she 
focuses on—and appears to place responsibility for—the rise in numbers of cases 
requiring counsel largely on Gideon, and more specifically on Gideon’s extension 
to some misdemeanor prosecutions in the Argersinger line of cases. See id. at 
468–81; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Argersinger 
line of cases).  
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resource-allocation choice must be made, the resources should go 
to those charged with offenses that will lead to imprisonment in 
the event of conviction.”118 But imprisonment is not always a 
proxy for seriousness of the consequence. Many minor criminal 
charges can lead to major collateral consequences that require 
counseling and advocacy. We might decide, for example, that 
counsel plays a more critical role in representing an elderly, long-
term permanent resident noncitizen who faces deportation if 
convicted of his first offense for shoplifting (even if a jail sentence 
is off the table) than for a young person facing felony drug 
charges in a jurisdiction where he will be eligible for—and 
offered—a preplea diversionary program leading to dismissal of 
the charges upon successful completion (even if imprisonment is a 
theoretical possibility). Despite failing to fully account for 
collateral consequences, Hashimoto offers a provocative proposal 
based on an important, albeit limited, empirical inquiry. 
4. Refusing to Triage 
Monroe Freedman, in a strong critique of the triagists’ 
argument that public defenders in many jurisdictions cannot 
zealously represent all of their clients, proposes an alternative 
response to triage: defenders should refuse to take on further 
clients.119 To do this, counsel should enlist supervisory assistance, 
and make a record that the basis for the refusal is the defender’s 
inability to deliver zealous representation (which entails the type 
of initial fact investigation that pattern representation 
forecloses).120  
This refusal to triage is consistent with Freedman’s position, 
along with co-author Abbe Smith in their important book, 
Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, that “zealousness continues 
today to be the fundamental principle of the law of lawyering and 
                                                                                                     
 118. Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 498 n.48. 
 119. See Freedman, Ethical Manifesto, supra note 109, at 920 (“In order to 
allow zealous investigation and research, defense counsel is forbidden to carry a 
workload that interferes with this minimum standard of competence, or one that 
might lead to the breach of other professional obligations.”). 
 120. Id. at 921–22. 
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the dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.”121 Indeed, in his 
critique of proposals for utilitarian triage in misdemeanor cases, 
Freedman has noted that “by honoring their ethical obligations, 
public defenders would cease to be an essential part of a 
fraudulent cover-up of the denial of fundamental rights to 
countless poor people who are caught up in a criminal justice 
system that is unethical, unconstitutional, and intolerably 
cruel.”122 
B. Shrinking Mass Misdemeanor Processing, Not Gideon 
In the literature on triage in criminal defense practice, 
individuals charged with minor misdemeanors are the losers. 
Under all of the triagists’ models for response to overload, the 
“small” case, which they describe as generally without significant 
consequences,123 does not merit much, if anything, in the way of 
defender resources. There is not enough to go around, something 
has to give, and individuals facing minor charges in the lower 
                                                                                                     
 121. FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 95, 
at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). Noting the “tepid endorsement of 
zealous representation” in the current version of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Freedman and Smith find “reason to believe” that these rules “will be 
interpreted to include the pervasive obligation of zealous representation.” Id. at 
83; see also Freedman, A Critique, supra note 91, at 91. 
 122. Freedman, Ethical Manifesto, supra note 109, at 923. Indeed, defenders 
in a number of jurisdictions, including Miami-Dade County, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland, Arizona, and Tennessee, have cited their 
professional and constitutional duty to provide effective assistance in turning 
down assignments to handle more cases or suing to reduce excessive caseloads. 
See, e.g., State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(certifying public defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising from 
excessive caseloads to Florida Supreme Court); State ex rel. Missouri Pub. 
Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Mo. 2012) (holding that trial 
court exceeded its authority in appointing public defender to represent 
defendant after public defender declined additional representation because it 
had exceeded its caseload capacity); Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise 
of Equal Justice, RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2009 (listing other jurisdictions), available 
at http://sfpublicdefender.org/2009/04/21/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equal-
justice. 
 123. To be fair, Mitchell (and to a very limited extent, Hashimoto) does note 
the potential for serious collateral consequences of minor criminal convictions. 
See Mitchell, supra note 103, at 1274 (discussing major collateral consequences); 
Hashimoto, The Price, supra note 91, at 498 n.148 (discussing the potential 
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction (citations omitted)). 
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criminal courts—and most defendants in the criminal justice 
system are in the lower criminal courts—get the short end of the 
resource stick.  
The problem with this approach is that it allows these 
seemingly minor cases to continue to move through the criminal 
justice system. Defense counsel, by failing to devote sufficient 
resources, in effect enhances the ability of legislators, police, and 
prosecutors to continue creating, arresting for, and prosecuting 
crimes that many might agree do not even belong in the criminal 
justice system.124 The criminal defense bar has a particular role 
to play in forcing the hand of these other institutional actors. By 
neglecting the least serious types of cases, at least as judged by 
the likely outcome in the criminal court, defenders also fail to 
challenge the legitimacy of these types of prosecutions. Defenders 
can help clients—often by simply offering representation that 
gives clients a true choice to reject a quick guilty plea—push the 
boundaries of the system, so that it can no longer handle the 
volume of misdemeanors currently flowing through.  
There is also no longer such a thing as a “slap on the wrist.” 
All convictions, even for the most minor of charges, come with a 
long list of “collateral consequences,”125 ranging from the loss of 
public housing and federal student loans to the inability to find 
work because the majority of employers now run criminal 
background checks on prospective employees.126 Indeed, in his 
                                                                                                     
 124. See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing recent ballot 
initiatives in Colorado and Washington decriminalizing marijuana). 
 125. Collateral consequences are the “wide range of status-related penalties 
that are permitted or required by law because of a conviction even if not 
included in the court’s judgment.” MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & 
CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, 
POLICY & PRACTICE 16 (2013); see also id. (recognizing that “[t]here is no 
consensus about how the term ‘collateral’ should be defined or about the legal 
implications of such a label”).  
 126. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006) (listing varying ineligibility 
periods for federal student loans, based on number of drug-related convictions); 
42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2006) (bars to public housing); see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN 
RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECKS 3 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/ 
Articles/Pages/BackgroundCheckCriminalChecks.aspx (noting that 73% of 
organizations surveyed conduct criminal background checks for all job 
candidates); cf. THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 131−34 (Nov. 
5, 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_transition2009.pdf 
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1970 Argersinger concurrence, Justice Powell noted that “the 
effect of a criminal record on employability . . . [is] frequently of 
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label 
‘petty.’”127 He pointed out that “[s]erious consequences also may 
result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma 
may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade. Losing one’s driver’s license is more serious for some 
individuals than a brief stay in jail.”128 
It is one thing to say that an individual pleading guilty to 
disorderly conduct does not necessarily need counsel to be 
assured a nonjail sentence. It is quite another to say that 
individual does not need counsel to understand that she will lose 
her public-school-system job and her public housing if she pleads 
guilty.129 Similarly, it is one thing to say a person does not need a 
lawyer to keep him out of jail on a public urination case. It is 
quite another to say he does not need serious counseling, from his 
own lawyer, about how, if he is in California, pleading guilty to 
public urination leads to lifelong sex offender registration.130 
                                                                                                     
(recommending various executive and legislative changes to deal with bars to 
employment for individuals with criminal records). 
 127. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
 128. Id. “When the deprivation of property rights and interest is of sufficient 
consequence, denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of 
defending themselves is a denial of due process.” Id. 
 129. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing collateral 
consequences associated with misdemeanors).  
 130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(b)–(c) (West 2012) (“Every person described 
in subdivision (c), for the rest of his or her life while residing in California . . . 
shall be required to register . . . in accordance with the [Sex Offender 
Registration] Act. The following persons shall be required to register: . . . 
[persons convicted under] subdivision 1 or 2 of Section 314 . . . .”); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 314(1) (West 2012) (“Every person who willfully and lewdly, either: 
Exposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any 
place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed 
thereby . . . [is guilty of a misdemeanor].”). 
In more than a decade of practicing and supervising lawyers and students 
in several different lower criminal courts, I have seen some defendants take 
guilty pleas without counsel that are the same as they likely would have gotten 
with counsel. I have seen judges impose sentences for unrepresented defendants 
that are the same as that person would have gotten with counsel. (Although 
certainly not always; I have also seen prosecutors “offer” unrepresented 
individuals a plea to the minor charge, when they will offer represented 
defendants a diversionary program). I have not, however, seen many 
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These are only a few brief examples; legislators continue to add to 
the lengthy list of collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
at the federal, state, and local level.131 
C. Arguments Against Defender Focus on Minor Misdemeanors 
(and Responses) 
This Part flags and briefly discusses the major arguments 
against a defender focus on minor misdemeanor cases. One 
response to all of these concerns is that any coordinated effort to 
“crash” or put pressure on the misdemeanor system must be 
locally tailored, and attempted only in certain jurisdictions.  
1. What Will Give? 
The most significant critique of misdemeanor-focused triage 
will be: what will give, if defenders focus on misdemeanor cases—
and in particular on minor, quality-of-life offenses in the lower 
courts? Do defenders short-shrift clients charged with serious 
felonies? With serious misdemeanors? Put fewer resources into 
capital cases?  
First, any triage in favor of misdemeanors would, ideally, be 
short-lived. It would not take long for the system to feel the cost 
of mass misdemeanor processing if defense counsel is no longer 
helping to coerce guilty pleas. Another way to mitigate the cost of 
focusing on minor misdemeanors is for public defenders to enlist 
outside assistance. Law school clinical programs might coordinate 
with public defenders in a time-limited, intensive focus on a 
particular group of cases.132 Coordination with law firms is 
another possibility. I have had a number of former criminal 
defense clinic students head off to large law firms with the hope 
of doing pro bono criminal defense work. I tell them that while 
                                                                                                     
unrepresented defendants go to trial in misdemeanor cases; rather, 
unrepresented individuals take early, quick guilty pleas.  
 131. See generally National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, supra note 2 (cataloguing collateral consequences in different 
jurisdictions). 
 132. Cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing clinic involvement 
in criminal trespass cases). 
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they should work to create such opportunities, most firms’ pro 
bono dockets do not include much trial-level representation, 
particularly not in the lower criminal courts. While there are 
many reasons firms might focus pro bono criminal law work on 
death penalty or other high-stakes appeals, law firms could also 
commit to misdemeanor representation. New attorneys with no 
exposure to criminal court should not simply step in to handle a 
case or two on their own, but many clinic professors would feel 
comfortable having former students handle a small number of 
minor misdemeanor charges pro bono, particularly if the firm was 
providing training and had connections with local practitioners, 
and particularly as part of a coordinated strategy focusing on a 
specific group of low-level offenses.  
Second, the need for crashing the system is not unique to the 
lower court context. One could certainly apply many of the same 
arguments to felony cases, and in particular to the large number 
of drug cases prosecuted. This Article’s specific focus is on the 
lower criminal courts, the pressing need for change at an 
opportune moment when states are fiscally strapped, and one 
way to advance such change. 
2. Trying to “Crash” the Misdemeanor System May Backfire 
Will misdemeanor lawyers willing to try cases—and their 
clients—suffer as a result of the attorney’s refusal to “meet ’em 
and plead ’em” and follow other such troubling aspects of regular 
lower court life? Prosecutors may respond to a coordinated effort 
to give clients the true option of going to trial in minor 
misdemeanors by seeking more punitive sentences in such cases, 
refusing to offer diversionary programs, and encouraging police 
officers to come to court to testify at trial (in cases that would 
otherwise not be a high priority for the officer).  
To some extent, the answer to this is in client counseling, so 
that defendants know exactly what they are risking when they 
agree that trial (or refusing to take an early plea) is the better 
option. Also, a focus on quality-of-life misdemeanors will 
necessarily limit any retaliatory response to exercising the right 
to trial, as these offenses tend to have lower direct criminal 
sanctions. However, this concern is not without merit. 
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3. Losing the Benefit of Lower Criminal Court Chaos 
What about individuals who benefit from the lower court 
chaos? These are generally repeat defendants, those who cycle 
through the system multiple times and benefit from the sheer 
volume in lower court by getting decent plea offers for cases in 
which (given their records) they might otherwise spend more time 
in jail. In some jurisdictions, particularly those with speedy trial 
statutes,133 the chaos of the lower criminal courts benefits 
individuals willing to come to court many times and wait things 
out; those individuals are more likely to gain a speedy trial 
dismissal or to wear the prosecution down and get a deferred 
adjudication.  
As those who have practiced in multiple jurisdictions know, 
particular benefits from chaotic courts are not universal.134 And 
the very same process costs that an overburdened system imposes 
to the benefit of some defendants works to the great detriment of 
many others who lose valuable work days and money coming to 
court multiple times.135 Most important, those who benefit from 
chaos due to sheer volume will certainly benefit more if they were 
never part of that volume in the first place.  
V. Conclusion 
Things have changed radically since Kelling and Wilson 
described the Newark beat cop who told loiterers to move on and 
noisy teens to keep quiet, and the judge who rarely saw people 
“caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of 
neighborhood order.”136 Today, millions of misdemeanors—many 
of them low-level, order-maintenance misdemeanors—end up in 
                                                                                                     
 133. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1972) (setting out New 
York’s statutory speedy trial limitations).  
 134. For example, student-attorneys raising a speedy trial dismissal issue in 
Syracuse, New York, under the same statute used with frequent success some 
250 miles away in New York City, were apparently the first to do so in recent 
memory in that courthouse.  
 135. See FEELEY, supra note 58, at 292 (discussing the costs associated with 
overburdened defense attorneys); Howell, supra note 8, at 292–306 (same). 
 136. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 8, at 29. 
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the lower criminal courts.137 The result is mass misdemeanor 
processing through a criminal justice system that saddles 
individuals, and thus society, with harmful arrest and criminal 
records for minor offense convictions.  
Failures in the delivery of Gideon’s promise of effective 
representation for indigent defendants have led some to call for 
triage in the lower criminal courts, with less attention paid to 
those charged with minor misdemeanors, or even the total denial 
of counsel. Instead, public defenders should focus resources on 
misdemeanors, encouraging clients to reject quick, seemingly 
“easy” (but actually quite burdensome) guilty pleas, whether the 
result is a better disposition later in the case or a trial. Either 
way, refusing to process individuals quickly through the lower 
criminal courts will impose some of the real cost of mass 
misdemeanor processing on that system, in the hopes of 
“crashing” it. The “crash” would not be a dramatic event. Instead, 
if defense counsel litigated some of the many factual and legal 
issues that misdemeanors present, the system would grind to a 
halt under its own weight. The representation would be nothing 
more than Gideon and its progeny require, but would place the 
burden of mass misdemeanor processing on the courts and 
prosecution. Under this weight, legislators might act to reduce 
the short- and long-term costs of mass misdemeanor policing. 
Prosecutors, who should exercise discretion to reduce volume in 
the overburdened courts, would likely exercise this discretion. 
Police offers, who should exercise discretion on the street, would 
be encouraged to maintain order without making unnecessary 
arrests. 
  
                                                                                                     
 137. MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 1, at 11 (estimating that 
“the total number of misdemeanor prosecutions in 2006 was about 10.5 
million”). 
